• Part One: Static games with complete information
1.1. Representation of games in normal form; 1.2. Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies; 1.3. Motivation and definition of Nash equilibrium; 2.1. The Cournot duopoly model; 2.2. Bertrand's duopoly model (for b = 1); 3.1. Mixed strategies; 3.2. Existence of Nash equilibrium.
• Second part: Dynamic games with complete information
1.1. Theory: "backward induction"; 1.2. Stackelberg's duopoly model; 2.1. Theory: perfection in subgames; 2.2. The bank run; 3.1. Theory: Two-stage repeated games; 3.2. Theory: Infinitely repeated games; 3.3. Collusion between oligopolysts in the model of Cournot; 4.1. Representation of games in extended form; 4.2. Perfect Nash equilibrium in subgames.
• Third part: Static games with incomplete information
Outline: representation in normal form, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, Cournot duopoly with incomplete information, bank run with incomplete information.
• Part Four: Dynamic games with incomplete information
Outline: perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, signaling games.